Rabbi Dr. Ari Berman, President and Rosh Yeshiva | Yeshiva University
Rabbi Dr. Ari Berman, President and Rosh Yeshiva | Yeshiva University
Researchers have revealed critical insights into how failures spread in interconnected networks, offering new strategies for managing systemic risks in various fields, from finance to infrastructure. Their paper, “Cascading Failures in Bipartite Networks with Directional Support Links,” appears in Physical Review E.
Cascading failures occur when the failure of a single component in a network leads to subsequent failures, potentially causing a system-wide collapse. This phenomenon is particularly significant in interdependent networks, where the functioning of one network depends on another. They occur on the internet, where traffic is rerouted to bypass malfunctioning routers unequipped to handle extra traffic. Most failures emerge and dissipate locally, largely unnoticed. However, some percolate through dense technological and social networks, affecting users unexpectedly.
Sergey Buldryev, a co-author of the paper and professor of physics at Yeshiva University and Boston University, explained that during blackouts, cascading failures occur when power lines become overburdened by surges of electricity. The grid distributing electricity malfunctions within a short period due to interconnectivity vulnerabilities.
The study examines two interconnected networks with directional links—where relationships flow one way like between a supplier and customer. Using generating function formalism, researchers modeled these cascading failures through equations describing how failures propagate through large networks. The study’s key finding is that cascading failure behavior mainly depends on incoming links to each node.
David Roth, an M.A. student in Physics at Katz School and co-author of the paper stated: “Through extensive simulations, we found that the type of outgoing links did not significantly impact the overall failure process.” Bo Tong, lead author and Ph.D. student in Mathematics at Katz School added: “This was true for various types of networks including those with random link distributions (Poisson distributions) and more complex uneven distributions (Pareto). However, certain Pareto distributions experience prolonged instability before settling.”
Researchers found that directional networks can be either more or less vulnerable than bidirectional counterparts depending on specific conditions. They highlighted predicting whether a network will gradually respond to failures or experience catastrophic collapse if initial failure exceeds a threshold as crucial for practical purposes. Networks with lower average connections were found more resilient to sudden large-scale collapses.
“This research has significant implications for real-world networks,” said David Roth. “For instance, in financial systems directional links can represent asset and liability flows between banks.” The findings help explain how financial crises like the Great Recession in 2008 can lead to widespread institutional failures.
By comparing results to phase transitions in physics (e.g., liquid to gas), researchers provided new understanding methods for network collapses showing that similar critical points exist where small increases in initial failures cause dramatic collapses.
Expanding their model to consider simultaneous attacks on both interconnected networks showed theoretical predictions matched well with simulation results reinforcing model robustness. This opens avenues for further exploration particularly developing strategies strengthening network resilience mitigating cascading failure impacts.
“This study marks significant advancement understanding cascading failures interdependent networks,” said Sergey Buldryev adding: “Focusing on directionality links specific conditions leading network collapse provides valuable tools predicting managing risks complex systems.” Insights could prove vital designing resilient infrastructures financial systems ultimately preventing future crises.